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I Comments
Better Strategies to Fight Workplace
Sexual Harassment In New Jersey: Why
the Title VII Affirmative Defense
Should Apply to the Law Against
Discrimination
I. Introduction
Many victims of sexual harassment in the workplace seek
protection under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and
similar state anti-discrimination statutes.2 From the perspective of
employers, one of the most difficult problems is determining their
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(17) (2001) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides in pertinent part: "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's...
sex .... ).
2. See generally David W. Garland & Lynne Anne Anderson, The
Affirmative Defense: Faragher and Ellerth's Impact on New Jersey Employers, 155
N.J.L.J. 1261 (1999) [hereinafter Garland] (explaining that employees in New
Jersey often seek relief under that state's anti-discrimination statute-the Law
Against Discrimination or the LAD for-short-because unlike the federal Title
VII, the LAD does not have compensatory or punitive damage-award caps).
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potential liability for sexual harassment by their supervisors.3 After
years of uncertainty regarding employer liability for supervisors'
acts of sexual harassment, the United States Supreme Court
clarified Title VII's sexual harassment law in two 1998 decisions:
Burlington Industries, v. Ellerth4 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton.5 In these two decisions, the Court relied on its previous
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,6 as well as on
agency principles from the Restatement (Second) of Agency,7 to
define an employer's liability when a supervisor has subjected a
subordinate employee to a hostile work environment.8 Specifically,
in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court held that "an employer is
3. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998) (holding that
employers are vicariously liable for the tortuous conduct of a supervisor, but
subject to an affirmative defense when the employee has not suffered a tangible
employment action (i.e., a significant change in employment status such as
discharge, demotion or undesirable reassignment); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 763-64 (1998) (applying the same holding as Faragher); see also
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,
C.J., concurring and dissenting)) (acknowledging that "[e]veryone knows by now
that sexual harassment is a common problem in the American workplace.").
4. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
5. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
6. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that
traditional principles of agency law were relevant to devise standards of employer
liability when liability for the tortuous actions of supervisors was not otherwise
obvious, but stopping short of holding employers automatically liable for
supervisory sexual harassment).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219(1), 219(2) (1957). Section
219(1) provides, "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment." Id. at § 219(1). Section
219(2) provides:
[A] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. at § 219(2).
8. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 n.3. In Faragher, the Court cited Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB for the proposition that a hostile work environment is one that is "so
,severe or pervasive' as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment." Id. at 786 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). In Faragher, the Court also cited its
decision in Harris v. Forklift Syss., Inc. to further explain that for sexual
harassment to be actionable under Title VII, "a sexually objectionable
environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so." Id. at 787 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-
22 (1993)).
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vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a
supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the
reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a
plaintiff victim."9 For employers, Ellerth and Faragher were hailed
as clarifications that should enable them to significantly limit their
liability in hostile environment claims." Following Ellerth and
Faragher, employers know that they can significantly shield
themselves from sexual harassment lawsuit liability under Title VII
for a supervisor's sexual harassment." Specifically, one way for
employers to protect themselves is by promulgating and effectively
disseminating anti-harassment policies at their workplaces so that
they are eligible to use the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth
and Faragher2
Title VII is not, however, the only source of relief from sexual
harassment in the workplace. Federal law allows states to
promulgate their own anti-discrimination statutes,'3 and as a result,
most states have enacted such statutes.'" Under Title VII, victims of
sexual harassment in the workplace may obtain equitable,
9. Id. at 780.
10. See Garland, supra note 2, at 1261; Evelyn Apgar, Sex Harass Rulings
Underscore Preventative Policies, New Jersey Lawyer (July 6, 1998) (noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings will be helpful because they provide some
guidance as to how courts view the obligations of both employers and individual
employees).
11. Evelyn Apgar, Sex Harass Rullings Underscore Preventative Policies, New
Jersey Lawyer (July 6, 1998).
12. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
13. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., 80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Title VII only preempts inconsistent state laws).
14. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2000) (defining unlawful employment
practices); CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (2001) (defining unlawful employment
practices); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (2000) (defining unlawful employment
practices); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West 2001) (defining unlawful employment
practices); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 2000) (defining unlawful
employment practices); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, Art. 49B, § 16 (2000) (defining
unlawful employment practices); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2000) (defining
unlawful employment practices); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination in employment); Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2001) (defining
unlawful employment practices); NEV. REV. STAT. 613.330 (1999) (defining
unlawful employment practices); N.J. STAY. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2001) (defining
unlawful employment practices); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296 (McKinney (2000)
(defining unlawful discrimination practices); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(West 2000) (defining unlawful employment practices); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030
(1999) (defining unlawful employment practices); 43 P.S. § 955 (2000) (defining
unlawful discriminatory practices in employment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2000)
(defining unlawful employment practices); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2000)
(providing a right to be free from discrimination in the workplace); WI. STAT. §
111.322 (2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination).
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compensatory, and punitive relief from their employers. 5 The
types of relief that state anti-discrimination statutes provide are not
necessarily identical to those types available under Title VII."6 One
state anti-discrimination statute that provides significantly more
relief and protection to victims of sexual harassment than Title VII
is New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD").
In fact, "New Jersey['s] appellate courts have been pace-setters
in the area of employee rights."18 New Jersey's Supreme Court "has
incorporated Title VII['s] philosophy into the LAD, but has applied
Title VII['s] standards with flexibility." 19 While the U.S. Supreme
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (West 1999) (providing standards for determining
punitive and compensatory damages, as well as setting forth limits on the amounts
plaintiffs may recover). Specifically, under section 1981a, "[a] complaining party
may recover punitive damages under this section ... if the complaining party
demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in a discriminatory practice or
discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,
527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) to demonstrate what
employer conduct qualifies for the availability of punitive damage awards). In
addition, section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory and punitive
damages a plaintiff may obtain from a liable employer. 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D). Section 1981a(b)(3) limits these damages based on the
number of employees at the employer's place of business. Id. For example, the
aggregate maximum amount of compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff
working at a business of 500 or more employees may receive is $300,000. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(D).
16. Compare Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12125, *10
n.5 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2000) (noting that under the Missouri Human Rights Act,
there is no limit on the amount of punitive damages a successful plaintiff may
recover), and VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 923-24 (Alaska 1999)
(allowing a plaintiff, under Alaskan state law, to recover punitive damages against
the employer under a theory of vicarious liability when there is supervisory
harassment or when the harassing non-supervisor was acting within the scope of
employment (i.e., furthering the employer's interests)), with Hoy v. Angelone, 720
A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 1998) (holding that punitive damages are not available under
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); see also supra note 15 (explaining how
Title VII's damages provisions work).
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1999). The LAD provides in pertinent
part:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an
unlawful discrimination (a) [f]or an employer, because of the... sexual
orientation, genetic information, sex.., of any individual,... to refuse to
hire or employ or to discharge... from employment.., or to
discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a).
18. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 584, 591 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing
Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) and Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-
Car Syss., Inc., 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding that obese
persons may be considered handicapped under the LAD)).
19. Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 1990).
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Court has moved to limit employers' liability for sexual harassment
by allowing the use of an affirmative defense in Title VII claims,
New Jersey's courts have not yet followed the federal lead with
respect to LAD claims." The concern for employers is that when
state anti-discrimination statutes provide broader relief to
employees than Title VII provides, many victims of sexual
harassment in that state will likely sue their employers under both
Title VII and the state statute.21
A number of state courts have already decided to adopt the
U.S. Supreme Court's affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and
Faragher for employers' use against claims filed under state anti-
discrimination laws.22 This Comment will address the specific issue
of whether New Jersey courts should allow defendant employers
sued under the LAD to plead and prove the Ellerth and Faragher
affirmative defense. Part IL-A of the Comment will describe Title
V1I's purposes and provide a short history of the U.S. Supreme
Court's development and application of agency principles to Title
VII sexual harassment claims. Part IL-A will look specifically at
20. Compare Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (holding
that in the absence of a tangible employment action, the employer may escape
liability by proving an affirmative defense, which requires that the employer
demonstrate its reasonable actions in responding to or preventing harassment and
the employee's unreasonable failure to take advantage of the employer's
complaint procedures), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(1998) (applying the same holding as Ellerth), with Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626
A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993) (holding that the presence of well-publicized complaint
procedures to combat sexual harassment policy might only suggest that the
employer was not negligent and therefore not liable for compensatory damages).
21. See Garland, supra note 2, at 1261 (noting New Jersey's uncapped
compensatory and punitive damages as the reason why most employees seek
protection under the LAD); see also N.J. STAT. § 10:5-3 (West 1999) (intending
that damages traditionally available in common law tort actions, including
compensatory and punitive damages, be available to all persons protected by the
LAD).
22. See, e.g., Parker v. Warren County Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 1999)
(holding that the Ellerth and Faragher employer liability standard and affirmative
defense apply in sexual harassment claims under the Tennessee Human Rights
Act); Sangster v. Albertson's Inc., No. 17528-6-111, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 58, at
*17-*18 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000) (reversing the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanding the case to determine
whether, under Washington's anti-discrimination statute, the alleged harasser
created a hostile work environment and allow the defendant to assert the Ellerth
and Faragher affirmative defense); Wille v. Hunkar Labs., Appeal No. C-971107,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6433, at *25-*26 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1998) (citing with
approval to the Ellerth and Faragher vicarious liability standards and the
affirmative defense); Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 591 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998) (applying the Ellerth and Faragher vicarious liability for supervisory




Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher, the leading U.S. Supreme Court
cases applying traditional agency principles to Title VII sexual
harassment claims. Part II-B will provide background of the LAD
and the leading New Jersey Supreme Court applications of the
LAD to hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.
Part 111-A will consider the advantages of the affirmative
defense by examining the reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted it. Part III-B will examine recent uses of the affirmative
defense in federal courts to evaluate its effect on employer liability.
Part II-C will discuss when and why New Jersey's courts have
previously looked to Title VII analysis for guidance when
interpreting the LAD. Part III-D will consider New Jersey's use of
vicarious liability standards and the significance of employers'
internal complaint mechanisms and anti-harassment policies under
the LAD.
Part IV will conclude by suggesting that the New Jersey
Supreme Court should allow employers sued under the LAD for
supervisory sexual harassment to plead and prove the Title VII
affirmative defense when the employee has not suffered a tangible
employment action.
II. Background
A. The Evolution of Employer Liability for Supervisors' Sexual
Harassment under Title VI- The Leading Cases
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers
from discriminating against their employees on the basis of an
23employee's sex and seeks "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. 24 The
United States Supreme Court has held that both quid pro quo
sexual harassment, which occurs when a supervisor demands sexual
favors in return for a job benefit, and hostile work environment
harassment, which occurs when a supervisor's sexually demeaning
behavior is severe or pervasive, are unlawful alterations in the
terms and conditions of employment, and therefore violate Title
VII.25 With the goal of ridding workplaces of discrimination, Title
23. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-52 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); see also
supra note 1 for the quoted text of this section.
24. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
25. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
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VII's "primary objective," however, "like that of any statute meant
to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid
harm.
, 26
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue of employer
liability for supervisory sexual harassment in Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson.27 In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson was an employee at
Meritor Savings Bank from 1974 through 1978. 2' After she left her
employment at Meritor, Vinson filed a complaint against her
supervisor, Sidney Taylor, and the bank, claiming that Taylor
constantly subjected her to sexual harassment during her tenure as
an employee. 9 Vinson alleged specific incidents when Taylor
demanded sexual favors from her while at work, fondled her in
front of other employees, and followed her into the women's
restroom where he exposed himself and even raped her on several
occasions." Both the bank and Taylor denied these allegations at
trial and Vinson did not offer significant evidence to support her
allegations.' The District Court concluded that Vinson was not a
victim of sexual harassment or discrimination. 2 Further, noting the
bank's express anti-discrimination policy and finding that no other
employees had ever filed a sexual harassment complaint about
Taylor, the District Court concluded that the bank lacked notice of
the harassment and therefore could not be liable for Taylor's
alleged actions:" The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded Vinson's case because the
lower court failed to consider whether Taylor's conduct had created
a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.34 The Court of
Appeals then held that the bank was "absolutely liable for sexual
harassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
[bank] knew or should have known about the misconduct."35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately affirmed
the Court of Appeals, but for different reasons. 6 In its opinion, the
26. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (citing Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417).
27. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id. at 61. In its opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that the District
Court would only allow Vinson to call certain witnesses for rebuttal to support her
charge that the supervisor fondled other female employees. Id. Vinson did not
end up offering other witness' testimony in rebuttal. Id.
32. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
33. Id.
34. Id.




Court recognized Congress's intent for courts to look to traditional
agency principles when devising standards for employer liability for
a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee in situations when
employer liability was not otherwise clear.3" The Meritor Court
rejected two specific limits on employer liability, but established the
rule that some limit was intended. 8 First, the Meritor Court held
that "[(1)] neither the existence of a company grievance procedure
nor [(2)]the absence of actual notice of the harassment on the part
of upper level management would be dispositive of such a claim;
while either might be relevant to the liability, neither would result
automatically in employer immunity."39 Next, the Court held that
Title VII places some limit on employer liability for the creation of
a hostile environment by a supervisor, thus rejecting the lower
court's conclusion that employers are strictly liable for supervisory
harassment even when the employer neither knew nor reasonably
could have known of the harassment.4 °
Since Meritor, and prior to Ellerth and Faragher, the courts of
appeals struggled to apply the Supreme Court's directions in
Meritor, and different circuits adopted different approaches for
dealing with employer liability in sexual harassment suits. 4 Finally,
in June 1998, the Court attempted "to derive manageable standards
to govern employer liability for hostile environment harassment
perpetrated by supervisory employees."
4 2
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court relied on the foundation it
laid in Meritor to clarify employer liability for supervisory
harassment under Title VII.43 In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly
Ellerth, worked for the defendant-employer, Burlington Industries,
Inc., from March 1993 until May 1994.' Ellerth alleged that during
her period of employment at Burlington Industries, her supervisor,
Ted Slowik, subjected her to constant sexual harassment.45 Slowik
37. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (citing with
approval the Restatement of Agency §§ 219-237).
38. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998) (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).
39. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).
40. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69-70, 72).
41. Id. at 785-86 (citing cases from the Tenth, Eleventh, Second, and District
of Columbia Circuits as representative of different approaches of applying the
Court's Meritor directions).
42. Id. at 785.
43. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-64 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998).




was a "mid-level manager" with the authority to hire and promote
employees, subject to the approval of his supervisor. 6
Though Slowik allegedly made repeated "boorish and
offensive remarks and gestures," Ellerth emphasized three
incidents when Slowik's comments could be construed as threats to
deny Ellerth "tangible job benefits."47 First, in the summer of 1993
while on a business trip with Ellerth, Slowik made numerous
remarks about Ellerth's breasts. 8 When Ellerth failed to show any
interest in these remarks, Slowik told her to "loosen up" and
warned that he could make her life at work very hard or very easy."
Second, in March 1994 when Ellerth was being considered for a
promotion, Slowik expressed reservations because he said she was
not "loose enough."5  Slowik then reached over and rubbed
Ellerth's knee." When he called to announce Ellerth's promotion,
Slowik told Ellerth, "You're gonna be out there with men who
work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty
butts/legs."52 Finally, in May 1994 when Elle'rth requested to do
something at work, Slowik responded that he did not have time for
her unless she wanted to tell him what she was wearing.53 Later,
when Ellerth called back to make her request again, Slowik asked if
she was wearing shorter skirts yet because, he said, "it would make
[her] job a whole heck of a lot easier. 54 Thereafter, Ellerth quit
working at Burlington.55
Ellerth did not inform anyone of authority about Slowik's
conduct at any time while working at Burlington, though she knew
the company had a policy against sexual harassment. 6 In October
1994, Ellerth filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois claiming that Burlington Industries
engaged in sexual harassment. 7 The District Court held that while
Slowik's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to create a
hostile working environment, Burlington had no reason to know
46. Id. (citing Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1119 n.14 (N.D.
Ill. 1996)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 748.





54. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748 (1998).
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (N.D. Ill.
1996)).
57. Id. at 749.
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about the conduct, and thus granted Burlington's motion for
summary judgment.5
The Seventh Circuit, en banc, reversed in a decision with eight
separate opinions. 9 The only consensus the judges could reach was
that vicarious liability, not negligence, was the essence of Ellerth's
case. 60 Thus, Ellerth could only recover if she could show that
Slowik's threats to deny her tangible job benefits were sufficient to
impose vicarious liability on Burlington.' The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to "assist in defining the relevant standards of
employer liability.,
62
When the Supreme Court decided Ellerth, the Court also
decided a companion case, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.6 While
she attended college between 1985 and 1990, Beth Ann Faragher
was a part-time life guard for the Marine Safety Section of the
Parks and Recreation Department of Boca Raton, Florida. 64
During this period, Faragher's immediate supervisors were Bill
Terry, David Silverman, and Robert Gordon.
After she resigned from her lifeguard position, Faragher filed a
Title VII claim against Terry, Silverman, and the City alleging that
Terry and Silverman, as agents of the City, created a hostile work
environment.66 The District Court for the Southern District of
Florida found that throughout Faragher's employment, Terry, in his
position as Chief of the Marine Safety Division, had the authority
to hire new lifeguards (subject to approval by his superiors),
supervise all aspects of the lifeguards' work assignments, counsel
employees, give oral reprimands, and make records of any
58. Id. (noting that the District Court reasoned that a negligence standard
applied because the quid pro quo conduct contributed to the hostile working
environment); see also supra text accompanying note 25 (explaining the difference
between quid pro quo harassment claims and hostile work environment claims).
In Ellerth, the Court noted that for purposes of establishing employer liability
under Title VII, the terms "quid pro quo sexual harassment" and "hostile work
environment" merely "illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat
which is carried out and offensive conduct in general." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
The terms are relevant "when there is a threshold question of whether the plaintiff
can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII." Id. at 753.
59. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749 (1998).
60. Id. at 749-50 (citing Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490,
494 (7th Cir. 1997)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 751.
63. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).





discipline.67 Silverman was a lieutenant from 1985 until 1989 when
he became a captain.' Gordon was also a lieutenant and eventually
received a promotion to training captain.69 All three supervisors
had authority to make the lifeguards' daily work assignments,
supervise their work, and train them." The lifeguards reported to
the lieutenants, the captains reported to Terry, and Terry reported
to the Recreation Superintendent, who in turn reported to the
Director of Parks & Recreation. The lifeguards had no significant
contact with the higher city officials, such as the Recreation
Superintendent.72
During Faragher's tenure at the Marine Safety Section, "Terry
repeatedly touched the bodies of the female employees without
invitation,.., put his arm around Faragher, with his hand on her
buttocks, and once made contact with another female lifeguard in a
motion of sexual simulation., 73  Terry also made demeaning
references to women in general and "once commented
disparagingly about Faragher's shape., 74  Silverman behaved
crudely towards women as well. 5 For example, Silverman once
tackled Faragher and told her that but for a physical characteristic
he found unattractive, he would like to have sex with her. 6
Another time, Silverman "pantomimed an act of oral sex.,
7
Silverman also made frequent comments within earshot of female
lifeguards about their bodies, and twice told female lifeguards he
wanted to have sex with them. 8
The District Court found that in February 1986, the City
adopted a sexual harassment policy in the form of a memorandum
from the City manager addressed to all employees. 9 The court also
67. Id. at 781 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563-
64 (S.D. Fla. 1994)).
68. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 781 (1998). (citing Faragher,
864 F. Supp. at 1555).
69. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1564).
70. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1564).
71. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1555).
72. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1564).
73. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (citing Faragher,
864 F. Supp. at 1556-57).
74. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1557).
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1557).
77. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1557).
78. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (citing Faragher,
864 F. Supp. at 1557-58).
79. Id. at 781-82 (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1560). Neither the Supreme
Court's nor the District Court's opinion provided details of the City's sexual
harassment policy. See id.; Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1560.
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found that though the City circulated the memos to some
employees, "it completely failed to disseminate the policy among
employees of the Marine Safety Section. '  As a result, Terry,
Silverman, and Gordon were unaware of the policy."
Faragher did not complain of Terry's or Silverman's conduct to
senior management.8 Faragher did, however, speak to Gordon
about these incidents, though she did not consider them formal
complaints to a supervisor.8 Gordon did not report these or any
discussions with the other female lifeguards to Terry or to other city
officials.' Finally, in April 1990, a former lifeguard wrote to the
City's Personnel Director complaining that Terry and Silverman
harassed her and other female lifeguards." The City investigated
the complaint, found that Terry and Silverman had behaved
improperly, and required them to choose either a suspension
without pay or forfeiture of their annual leave.'
Based on these findings, the District Court concluded that
Terry's and Silverman's conduct constituted a hostile work
environment.87 The court then held that the City was liable to
Faragher for its supervisors' harassment.'
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed the
District Court's decision.8 9 Relying on the principles set forth in
Meritor, the full Eleventh Circuit held that "traditional agency law
does not employ so broad a concept of [aided by the agency
relationship (section 219(2)(d))] as a predicate of employer liability,
but requires something more than a mere combination of agency
relationship and improper conduct by the agent."'  Thus, the court
concluded that since neither Terry nor Silverman threatened to fire
80. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782 (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1560).
81. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1560).
82. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1559).
83. Id. at 782 (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1559).
84. Id. at 782-83 (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1559-60).
85. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 783 (1998) (citing Faragher,
864 F. Supp. at 1559).
86. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1559).
87. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1562-63); see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text (citing cases and defining "hostile work environment").
88. Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1563). The District Court found three
justifications for holding the City liable, including "under traditional agency
principles because Terry and Silverman were acting as its agents when they
committed the harassing acts." Id. (citing Faragher, 864 F. Supp. at 1563). Thus,
the City was vicariously liable for the supervisor's acts. Id.
89. Id. at 784-85 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
90. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998) (citing Faragher,
111 F.3d at 1537).
[Vol. 105:2
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
or demote Faragher, their agency relationship did not facilitate the
harassment.9'
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to both Ellerth and
Faragher to address the divergence between the approaches of the
courts of appeals on the issue of employer liability for supervisory
harassment.9
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court promulgated the
following rule:
[aln employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment by a supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability
or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. (citation omitted) The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise. 93
Applying this rule to the factual situation in Ellerth, the Court
held that should Ellerth succeed on remand in proving that she has
a claim for which Burlington is liable, Burlington would be subject
to vicarious liability for Slowick's conduct.94 Since Ellerth did not
allege that she suffered a tangible employment action, Burlington
91. Id. (citing Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1537).
92. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998); Faragher, 524
U.S. at 785-86; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing
further the reasons for the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari to Ellerth
and Faragher).
93. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court held that
this rule for employer liability applies only when the employee has not suffered a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion or undesirable
reassignment. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. When an employee suffers a tangible
employment action in the context of sexual, racial, or age based discrimination (in
addition to the other classes Title VII protects), the rule is that the employer is
vicariously liable, without the advantage of an affirmative defense. Id. To reach
this conclusion, the Court reasoned that "tangible employment actions are the
means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear
on the subordinates." Id. at 762.
94. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766 (suggesting that Ellerth should have an opportunity
to amend her complaint in light of the Court's holding that the labels quid pro quo




should have the opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative
defense .95
Applying the rule in Faragher, the Court concluded that
Terry's and Silverman's conduct created a hostile work
environment for Faragher.96 Further, the Court noted that the
District Court had found that the City failed entirely to disseminate
its anti-harassment policy among the beach employees, the City's
officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of the
supervisors like Terry or Silverman, and the City's policy did not
include any procedure for complaints to bypass the harassing
supervisors.97 Consequently, the Court held "as a matter of law that
the City could not have been found to have exercised reasonable
care to prevent the supervisor's harassing conduct." 98 The Court
then concluded that the City should not even have an opportunity
on remand to assert and prove the affirmative defense.9
B. Employer Liability for Supervisors' Sexual Harassment Under
New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination-Lehman v. Toys 'R'
Us and Related Subsequent Developments
Section 10:5-3 of the LAD declares that "practices of
discrimination against any of [New Jersey's] inhabitants because
of... sex.., threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of
the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free and democratic State.""°  The New Jersey
Legislature also recognized that as a result of workplace
discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, including physical
and emotional stress as well as economic loss, and the State suffers
a grievous harm.'0 '
95. Id.
96. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court distinguished the City's burden from that of a small business
owner's who may expect to be able to informally provide sufficient care to prevent
tortious conduct by its supervisors. Id. The City employees responsible for beach
operations could not have reasonably believed that "precautions against hostile
environments in any one of many departments in far-flung locations could be
effective without communicating some formal policy against harassment, with a
sensible complaint procedure." Id. at 808-09.
99. Id. at 809.
100. N.J. STAT. § 10:5-3 (West 1999).
101. Id. (listing personal hardships including, inter alia, severe emotional
trauma, illness, homelessness, relocation, search and moving difficulties, anxiety




The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
the LAD is "nothing less than the eradication 'of the cancer of
discrimination." ' 2 The court has also remarked that the LAD "was
enacted to protect not only the civil rights of aggrieved employees,
but also to protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination
free workplace."'' 3  "Employment is not just a matter between
employer and employee. The public interest in a discrimination-
free workplace infuses the inquiry."'" Thus, the LAD is a sweeping
attempt by the New Jersey Legislature to combat the problem of
discrimination in the workplace.' 5
The leading case addressing supervisory sexual harassment
claims under the LAD is Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us. 6 In Lehman, the
plaintiff, Theresa Lehman, began working as a file clerk in Toys 'R'
Us's Purchasing Department in 1981 and subsequently received
various promotions to supervisory positions.'0 7  Lehman's
supervisor, Don Baylous, worked closely with Lehman, including
hosting weekly meetings between the two in his office.' 0 Around
December 1986, Lehman began noticing what she considered
offensive sexual remarks and touchings from Baylous directed at
other female employees." Baylous also directed sexually harassing
comments toward Lehman, including telling her to lean over a
fellow employee's desk and "show him your tits," implying that the
fellow employee would not get mad at Lehman when she told him
some bad news." On another occasion in Baylous's office, Baylous
walked up behind Lehman, lifted the back of her shirt, exposed her
bra, and told her to expose her breasts."'
Lehman complained to Baylous' immediate boss, Bill
Frankfort, who told Lehman to handle the situation herself and not
to report the incident to the Executive Vice President of
Purchasing."2 Lehman also reported Baylous's conduct to Eric
Jonas, the Manager of Employee Relations."' When Baylous's
102. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 451 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Fuchilla v.
Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (N.J. 1988)).
103. Id. (citing Fuchilla, 109 N.J. at 335).
104. Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 335 (N.J. 1988).
105. Id. (comparing the LAD to the more limited aim of the Tort Claims Act,
which provides compensation to tort victims).
106. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993).









behavior continued, Lehman again informed Frankfort and Jonas."4
Jonas offered Lehman an intra-company transfer, but Lehman
refused because she liked her job and believed that she had not
done anything wrong.'15 Dissatisfied with the response she received,
Lehman complained to the Executive Vice President of Purchasing,
Howard Moore."6 Though Moore was upset to hear of Baylous's
conduct, his only solution was to offer Lehman a transfer within the
company."7 After confronting Baylous directly but failing to reach
a satisfactory resolution, Lehman resigned from Toys 'R' Us."
8
Lehman brought an action under the LAD against Toys 'R'
Us, her former supervisor, and a human resources manager at the
store. "9 In her complaint, Lehman alleged that the defendants
subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex
in violation of the LAD. 20 Lehman requested relief for damages
"perpetrated and condoned" by the defendants' actions, including
lost wages and pension benefits, anxiety detriment to her health,
medical expenses, humiliation, and pain and suffering.'
21
At trial, Lehman contended that despite Toys 'R' Us's written
corporate anti-harassment policy requiring that all claims be fully
investigated and documented and the perpetrators receive
discipline, the company's investigation was nonetheless
inadequate.2 2 The trial court assumed that Lehman's contentions
were true, but nevertheless held that Lehman failed to state a claim
for hostile work environment sexual harassment.'23 The Appellate
Division reversed the trial court's judgment.'24 The appellate court
held that Lehman's allegations would have satisfied a hostile work
environment claim had her factual allegations been credited by a
finder-of-fact. 25 Thus, the appellate court remanded the case for
further fact-finding.
1 26
The New Jersey Supreme Court then made a number of
important holdings regarding the standards of employer liability for
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 450 (N.J. 1993).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 451.
119. Id. at 448.
120. Id.





126. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445,451 (N.J. 1993).
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supervisory sexual harassment.1 27 First, the court held that under
the LAD, employers are strictly liable for all equitable damages
and relief.22 Equitable damages include, but are not limited to,
"hiring or reinstating the harassment victim, disciplining,
transferring or firing the harasser, providing back pay,... and
taking preventative or remedial measures at the workplace.'
29
Second, the court held that an employer can be vicariously
liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment according to
the principles set forth in section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. 30 Interpreting these agency principals, the court held that
an employer is vicariously liable if the supervisor acted within the
scope of his employment. 3' The employer is also vicariously liable
when the supervisor acted outside the scope of employment "if the
employer contributed to the harm through its negligence, intent,
apparent authorization of the harassing conduct, or if the supervisor
was aided in the commission of the harassment by the agency
relationship.', 3 2 Thus, like under Title VII, employers subject to the
LAD may be vicariously liable for compensatory damages resulting
from a supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment if the
supervisor was aided in creating that environment by the agency
relationship."'
The court also noted times when the employer can be directly
liable for the supervisor's harassment." These times include when
the employer lacks actual or constructive notice "if the employer
negligently or recklessly failed to have an explicit policy that bans
sexual harassment and that provides an effective procedure for the
prompt investigation and remediation of such claims."'35
127. See id. at 460.
128. Id. at 465-66 (reasoning that "[flor the remedial purposes of the LAD to
be fulfilled, the employer must take action, because generally the employer is the
party with the power and responsibility to hire, promote... and take other
remedial action."). Lehman's holding that employers are strictly liable in the case
of tangible employment actions is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Ellerth and Faragher that employers who subject employees to tangible
employment actions may not use the affirmative defense. Compare id. with,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998), and Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-64 (1998).
129. Lehman, 626 A.2d at 460.
130. Id. at 461; see also supra note 7 (quoting section 219).
131. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993); see also Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998) ("The general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.").






The court concluded that while an employer's liability for
sexual harassment when the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment "can be seen to flow from agency law, it can
also be understood as a form of direct liability." '36  The court
reasoned that when an employer fails to take effective measures to
stop harassment, that employer "sends the harassed employee the
message that the harassment is acceptable and that the
management supports the harasser." '137
Third, the court held that employers should be liable for
punitive damages "only in the event of actual participation by
upper management or willful indifference."'38  This standard for
employer liability, the court noted, was appropriately higher than a
standard of "mere negligence. '39
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed but
modified the Appellate Division's judgment, and remanded the
case to assess Toys 'R' Us's liability.
140
Since Lehman, the New Jersey Supreme Court has revisited
the issue of employer liability for supervisory harassment and
agency principles on a number of occasions. 1"' In particular, one
decision relevant to an employer's affirmative defense was Payton
v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth..142 In Payton, the court stated that
effective remedial steps that reflect a lack of tolerance for
harassment will be "relevant to the employer's affirmative defense
136. Id.
137. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993) (citing Katherine S.
Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment After
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1274 (1987)).
138. Id. (citing Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio
1988)).
139. Id. at 465.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 552 (2000) (holding
that employers "have a duty to take effective measures to stop co-employee
harassment when the employer knows or has reason to know that such harassment
is part of a pattern of harassment that is taking place in the workplace and in
settings that are related to the workplace."); Cavouti v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,
735 A.2d 548, 560-61 (N.J. 1999) (offering a definition for "upper management" to
determine when employers are liable for punitive damages to victims of sexual
harassment under the Lehman standards); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 693-94
(N.J. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in a hostile work
environment claim under the LAD to survive a defendant's motion for summary
judgment when the plaintiff's supervisor uttered a single racial slur against the
plaintiff).
142. Payton v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 327-28 (N.J. 1997)
(holding that an employer's remedial response to complaints of harassment is
relevant to and discoverable in an employee's LAD claim).
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that its actions absolve it from all liability.",141 "Effective remedial
measures," the court explained, "include the process by which the
employer arrives at the sanctions that it imposes on the alleged
harasser. 144 The timeliness of an employer's response and the
vigorousness of the employer's investigation are important
elements in determining the effectiveness of its anti-harassment
program. Thus, to date, the New Jersey Supreme Court has, "like
the U.S. Supreme Court... afforded a form of a safe haven for




The Discussion section will examine four main factors that the
New Jersey Supreme Court should consider when deciding whether
to allow defendant-employers sued under the LAD to assert and
prove the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense. First, the
Discussion will analyze the advantages of the affirmative defense by
examining the reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court adopted it.
Second, the Discussion will examine the recent use of the
affirmative defense in federal courts to evaluate its effect on
employer liability under Title VII. Third, the Discussion will
examine when and why New Jersey's courts have looked to Title
VII analysis in the past for guidance to interpret the LAD. Fourth,
the Discussion will consider New Jersey's standard of vicarious
liability and the significance of employers' anti-harassment policies
under Lehman and Payton.
A. The Advantages of the Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative
Defense
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court first recognized that Title
VII "is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms.', 7 Thus, the Court
concluded, a "theory of vicarious liability for misuse of supervisory
power would be at odds with the statutory policy [of Title VII] if it
143. Id. at 536-37.
144. Id. at 537.
145. Id.
146. Cavouti, 735 A.2d at 556.
147. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). In addition to
considering Title VII's goals, the Court concluded that because Meritor rejected
automatic liability for employers and Congress did not alter Title VII following
Meritor, the Court was not in a position to hold employers vicariously liable for
supervisory sexual harassment without some limit. Id.
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failed to provide employers with some such incentive [to establish a
complaint procedure].' 48 The Court also recognized the "equally
obvious policy" that employees should have an obligation to use
reasonable measures to avoid or mitigate harm of sexual
harassment in the workplace.4 9 Thus, the creation of duties on the
part of both employers and employees to eliminate harassment in
the workplace supported a "limited vicarious liability" rule.
The outcome of these two policy decisions was the two-part
Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense. 50 The affirmative defense
provides that when the employee does not suffer a tangible
employment action, the employer may raise the affirmative defense
to liability or damages subject to proof beyond a preponderance of
the evidence. 5' The first element of the affirmative defense is "that
the employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior.' ' 52 The second
element requires that the plaintiff-employee "unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' 53 If either
of these elements is not met, the employer may not avoid vicarious
liability.
154
148. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). The Court
noted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") 1990 policy
statement "enjoining employers to establish a complaint procedure 'designed to
encourage victims of harassment to come forward' without requiring 'a victim to
complain first to the offending supervisor."' Id. (quoting EEOC Policy Guidance
on Sexual Harassment, 8 F.E.P. Manual 405:6699 (Mar. 19,1990)). In light of this
EEOC Policy Statement and Title VII's purposes, the Court chose to recognize
employers' affirmative obligations to prevent harassment and "give credit to
employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duties." Id.
149. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.19 (1982))
(reasoning that an employee should not be able to recover damages that she could
reasonably have avoided through the use of an employer's "proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available
to the employee without undue risk.").
150. See id.
151. Id. at 807. In holding that the employer may not use the affirmative
defense when the employee suffers a tangible employment action, the Court
reasoned that such tangible employment decisions require "an official act of the
enterprise." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. In other words, it is as if the employer
himself acted. Consequently, the employer should not be able to avoid liability
when a tangible employment action occurs. Id.; see also supra note 3 (citing
examples of tangible employment actions).
152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
153. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
154. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The Court explained the affirmative defense by discussing
some hypotheticals.'55 First, the Court noted that proof of an
employer's anti-harassment policy with accompanying complaint
procedures "is not necessary in every instance as a matter of
law .... ,,1-6 Whether an anti-harassment policy and complaint
mechanisms are provided, however, is an issue for the litigants to
address in the first element of the defense. "7 Second, the Court
noted that proof that an employee failed to use reasonable care to
avoid the harm is not limited to showing any "unreasonable failure
to use any complaint procedure."15 8  Nevertheless, when the
employer does demonstrate the employee's failure to use the
complaint procedures, the employer will normally satisfy his burden
under the second element of the affirmative defense. 9
Though the affirmative defense allows employers to avoid
liability under Title VII when they satisfy both elements, the
affirmative defense still provides enough protection to harassed
employees. Some commentators argue that employees may make a
rational choice to not report harassment because they fear reprisals
or they do not consider the benefit of eliminating the broader harm
of discrimination in the workplace worthwhile enough to risk
destroying their work relationships.'9 But while some employees
may reasonably fear reprisals after reporting incidents of
harassment, reprisals are prohibited under both Title VII and the
LAD. 6' Moreover, how employers communicate to employees that
155. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
156. Id. It is hard to imagine, however, a scenario where the employer could
satisfy the first element when it failed to have in place an effective anti-harassment
policy and/or complaint procedures. See Kathleen A. Lieder & Christopher P.
Mazzoli, Feature, Northern Michigan: Ellerth and Faragher: Applying the Supreme
Court's "Delphic Pronouncements" on Employers' Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 78 MICH. BAR J. 432, 435-36 (1999) [hereinafter Lieder & Mazzoli].
Compare Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (noting that the existence of an anti-harassment
policy is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law), with Lehman v. Toys
'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993) (stating that the absence of complaint
mechanisms does not automatically constitute negligence).
157. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Note, Notice in Hostile Env't Discrimination Law, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1977, 1986 (1999); see also Kalley R. Aman, Comment, No Remedy for Hostile
Env't Sexual Harassment?: Balancing a Plaintiffs Right to Relief Against Protection
of Small Bus. Employers, 4 Small & Emerging Bus. L. 319, 328 (2000) (arguing that
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is too broad because courts should
instruct the finder of fact to consider certain potential factors, such as a plaintiff's
age, in the "reasonableness" analysis under the second part of the defense).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (2000).
Title VII's retaliation prohibition provides in pertinent part:
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complaints of harassment are encouraged and reprisals are
prohibited is a factor to consider when analyzing the reason-
ableness of the employer's policies under the first element of the
affirmative defense. 6 2 In addition, consideration of unique factors
regarding a particular employee's situation are relevant under the
second element of the affirmative defense.'63 Thus, the affirmative
defense provides for the trier of fact to consider all factors relevant
to the employer's and the employee's response to harassment.
By creating this affirmative defense, the Court has provided
employers with clearer guidance for dealing with supervisory
harassment by specifically encouraging the enforcement of effective
anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures, and allowing
employers to have a reasonable expectation that employees will
take advantage of their complaint procedures. Though this
affirmative defense will not prevent every instance of sexual
harassment by supervisors, it should be an incentive for employers
to be better aware of their liabilities, and therefore more confident
and vigorous when addressing the problem. Thus, the defense
should go a long way in eliminating supervisory harassment.
B. Use of the Affirmative Defense in Federal Courts
In the two-and-a-half years since Ellerth and Faragher, the
federal courts have had opportunities to apply and evaluate the
effectiveness of the affirmative defense in different factual
situations. Courts have looked to whether the employer has
demonstrated the reasonableness of its remedial scheme and
response to complaints, as well as to the employee's
unreasonableness in reporting the harassment.' 64 "[S]ome judges
have," however, "questioned the appropriateness of deciding cases
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this title.
Id. The LAD's reprisal prohibition provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice, or ... an unlawful discrimination: For any person
to take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any practices
or acts forbidden under this act or because that person has filed a complaint,
testified or assisted in any proceeding under this act .. " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
12(d) (2000); see also infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing
employee responsibilities to report and combat harassment in the workplace).
162. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
163. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
164. See Lieder & Mazzoli, supra note 156, at 434.
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on summary disposition when the affirmative defense is
involved."' 65  Other courts have held that the new affirmative
defense would not preclude summary judgment.
166
Courts have noted the importance of the presence of an anti-
harassment policy. 67 Some courts have held, as a matter of law,
that the employer meets the first element of the affirmative defense
by distributing a policy and demonstrating that the plaintiff was
aware of that policy.16 Another jurisdiction disagreed, concluding
that the mere presence and distribution of a policy was not enough
to satisfy the first element of the defense.1 69  Thus, practically
speaking, it seems clear that an effectively distributed anti-
165. Id. See, e.g., Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the reasonableness of a written sexual harassment policy, which was
posted at all stores and which the employee received and reviewed, was a question
of fact for the jury); Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(concluding that despite the presence of a sexual harassment policy that employees
received, the question of whether the employer should have known of the
harassment was for the jury).
166. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998)
(holding that as a matter of law, the City could not be found to have exercised
reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct when the record
showed that the City completely failed to disseminate its policy to the harassed
employees); see also Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., 139 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998);
Whitaker v. Mercer County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing
plaintiff's Title VII suit on summary judgment because the employer had no actual
or constructive knowledge of the harassment and the employer had an effective
complaint procedure in place); Guerra v. Editorial Televisia-USA, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10082, at *39 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's suit on
summary judgment because the employer had satisfied the affirmative defense).
167. See, e.g., Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc. 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Although not necessarily dispositive, the existence of an effective anti-
harassment policy with complaint procedures is an important consideration in
determining whether the employer has satisfied the first prong of [the] defense.");
Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 117 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
Ellerth and Faragher do not "focus mechanically on the formal existence of a
sexual harassment policy, allowing an absolute defense to a hostile work
environment claim whenever the employer can point to an anti-harassment policy
of some sort."); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting that "the employer's promulgation of an anti-harassment policy with
complaint procedure is an important, if not dispositive, consideration.").
168. See, e.g., Hooker v. Wentz, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19755, at *13 (S.D.
W.Va. Dec. 20, 1999) (concluding that the employer exercised reasonable care
once it became aware of the harassment, the employee failed to complain to the
employer about the harassment, and the employee's subjective fears of
confrontation or retaliation do not alleviate her duty to take advantage of an
effective remedial scheme); Speight v. Albano Cleaners, 21 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff admitted that she was aware of the policy but
did not use it).
169. See Lancaster v. Sheffler Enter., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (W.D. Mo.
1998) (noting that "[t]he employer must take reasonable steps in preventing,
correcting and enforcing the policy.").
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harassment policy to the employees is a minimum requirement of
the first element. Beyond that, cautious employers should consider
implementing other options, such as formal and informal complaint
procedures and training sessions on how to use the complaint
procedures. The effectiveness of these measures should be
analyzed under the first prong of the defense.
Since this affirmative defense is available to employers, courts
generally expect that employees will use the procedures to help
themselves.170  Reaching this conclusion, one court reasoned that
"employees must be required to accept responsibility for alerting
their employers to the possibility of harassment. Without such a
requirement, it is difficult to see how Title VII's deterrent purposes
are to be served .... While some employees might have a
reasonable explanation for not reporting the harassment, they will
need to cite specific facts to avoid having their claim dismissed on
summary judgment.1 72 Fear of reprisals, it seems, is not a sufficient
explanation, particularly when the employer's policy states that it
will not tolerate reprisals.
1 73
However courts have applied this affirmative defense, two
things are clear. First, as the. defense intends, employers must
provide complaint procedures and vigorously address reports of
sexual harassment. Second, employees must reasonably use the
procedures in place, or present a reasonable explanation of why
they did not use the complaint procedures. Thus, employees share
some of the burden of eliminating harassment in the workplace,
and by doing so help to effectuate the purposes of Title VII. These
clarifications to Title VII jurisprudence enable employers and
employees to better understand what they must do to comply with
the statute and act to achieve its ultimate goal of eliminating
discrimination in the workplace.
170. See Speight, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (concluding that an employee who was
aware of the complaint procedures, knew how to use them, had multiple chances
to report the harassment but did not do so, failed to exercise reasonable care in
giving notice to the employer, and thus could not hold the employer vicariously
liable).
171. Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
172. See id.
173. See Montero v. AGCO Corp, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998)
(noting that the employer's policy explained that all complaints would initially be
confidential and that any retaliation would not be tolerated); see also supra note
161 (discussing the reprisal prohibitions under both Title VII and the LAD). But
see Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(concluding that when a third party was afraid to report a supervisor's racial
harassment of an employee, the employer failed to show that the employee acted
unreasonably in not reporting the alleged harassment).
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C. Using Title VII as a Guide For Interpreting the LAD
New Jersey's courts have consistently looked to
interpretations of Title VII when interpreting their LAD.74 In fact,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has remarked that "[i]n a variety of
contexts involving unlawful discrimination, this Court has looked to
federal law as a key source of interpretive authority. The
substantive and procedural standards that we have developed under
the State's LAD have been markedly influenced by the federal
experience."'75  The New Jersey Supreme Court has also
"recognized... [the] need to harmonize our LAD with Title VII
and [has] borrowed from the federal experience to assure some
reasonable degree of symmetry and uniformity."76  Uniformity
between the LAD and Title VII and the clear requirements of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense will facilitate compliance with
the LAD for New Jersey's employers.
1. Purposes of Anti-Discrimination Statutes-Title VII and
the LAD have consistent purposes. ' Although courts have used
different language to describe the purposes of each statute, it is
obvious that both statutes desire to see an end to discrimination in
the workplace.' Thus, it makes sense for New Jersey's courts to
look at Title VII's experience when interpreting and defining
standards under the LAD.
2. When and Why the LAD Follows Title VII Analysis?-As
stated, Title VII has consistently served as a main source of
interpretive authority for the LAD.' 9 For example, the Lehman
174. See, e.g., Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 461 (N.J. 1993) (looking at
the U.S. Supreme Court's use of agency law in the Meritor decision); Erickson v.
Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 798-99 (N.J. 1990) (applying a Title VII
analysis to a LAD claim for unlawful gender discrimination and discharge); Peper
v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 479 (N.J. 1978) (adopting Title
VII's McDonnell-Douglas test for sexual discrimination under the LAD). But see
Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing that
McDonnell-Douglas criteria provide only a framework for analyzing unlawful
discrimination claims and must be modified where appropriate, but also
recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court "expressed the need for malleable
applications of the [McDonnell-Douglas] standard.").
175. Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 907-08.
176. Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
177. See generally supra notes 23-26, 100-05 and accompanying text (citing
courts' interpretations of the statutes' purposes).
178. Compare Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (noting
that Title VII's primary goal is to avoid injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination), with Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J.
1988) (noting that the broad goal of the LAD is the eradication of discrimination
in the workplace).
179. Supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (citing examples of cases that
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court looked to Meritor when defining elements of a hostile work
environment claim."' First, the Lehman court adopted the Meritor
standard that "'for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to cause the requisite harm.''. The
court concluded that this standard was appropriate because it
served the LAD's purpose of preventing the harm of hostile work
environments by making actionable randomly-occurring or even
single incidents of harassment."l Thus, the court determined that
by following the U.S. Supreme Court's Meritor standard, it was also
serving the LAD's goal.
Second, the Lehman court adopted the Meritor court's
standard for the requisite showing of harm.' 3 The Lehman court
concluded that a plaintiff must show that conduct complained of
was severe or pervasive enough "to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment."' ' The court adopted this standard because "[g]iven
the breadth of individual and societal harms that flow from
discrimination," a minimal threshold would satisfy the LAD's harm
requirement to state a cause of action.' Thus, as when adopting
Meritor's "severe or pervasive" standard, the New Jersey Supreme
Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court and opted to provide
plaintiffs with a lower burden of persuasion to better serve the
purpose of the LAD.
New Jersey's courts have also, on occasion, relied on Title VII
analysis, but chosen to adapt it for particular situations to ensure
that the LAD's goals are best served.8 6 Careful consideration of
have looked to Title VII for guidance).
180. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 455-57 (N.J. 1993) (citing Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) and federal cases interpreting Title
VII).
181. Id. at 455 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). In adopting this standard, the
Lehman court rejected an alternative standard that would have required plaintiffs
to show that the harassment was "regular or pervasive." Id. This standard differs
from the "severe and pervasive" standard because it requires that the harassment
occur on a regular basis to be actionable. Id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 456.
184. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 and federal cases interpreting Title VII).
In accepting the "altered conditions" standard, the court rejected a standard that
required "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that affected
seriously the [psychological] well-being of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)).
185. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d at 445, 456-57 (N.J. 1993) (noting that
discrimination is the harm the LAD seeks to eradicate).
186. See, e.g., Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J.
1990) (modifying the first prong of the McDonnell-Douglas test because the
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the LAD's purpose in light of a case's particular facts and unsettled
law in New Jersey may require some departure from the federal
courts' Title VII analysis.' In addition, the LAD's and Title VII's
standards may not be identical where New Jersey has promulgated
standards prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement on the
corresponding Title VII issue.' In general, however, when the U.S.
Supreme Court has announced standards for interpreting Title VII,
New Jersey's courts have relied on those announcements as
guidance when interpreting the LAD 9
Thus, there is sufficient precedential basis for New Jersey
courts to look to the U.S. Supreme Court's Ellerth and Faragher
affirmative defense and the corresponding federal court
applications of that analysis. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's
clear affirmative defense will in turn provide clearer guidance to
New Jersey's employers sued under the LAD because those
employers will have a better understanding of what actions they
must take and what messages they must send to their employees to
comply with the LAD.
D. Vicarious Liability, Employer Complaint Mechanisms and Anti-
Harassment Policies Under Lehman
Under Lehman, once an employee establishes that the
supervisor created a hostile work environment, the employer is
vicariously liable."9° The type and amount of damages for which the
plaintiff was a member of the "majority" and not a member of a protected class,
but citing federal courts' modifications in the same factual situations). Cf. Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 479 (N.J. 1978) (noting that the
McDonnell-Douglas test for a prima facie case for employment discrimination is an
appropriate starting point under the LAD, but emphasizing that these tests should
only be used "where and to the extent that their application is appropriate" under
the particular factual circumstances).
187. See, e.g., Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 912-13 (N.J.
1990) (applying the New Jersey Equal Pay Act analysis instead of the LAD
analysis in a wage discrimination claim, but noting that the question of which
analysis to use when the plaintiff brings such a claim in federal court-either Title
VII's McDonnell-Douglas analysis or the federal Equal Pay Act analysis-was
unresolved).
188. See, e.g., Cavouti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 556 (N.J.
1999) (noting that while language of the Lehman standards for determining
employer liability for punitive damages for supervisor sexual harassment,
announced in 1993, differs from the Title VII standards announced in Kolstad in
1999, the concepts are similar); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(explaining Title VII's compensatory and punitive damage provisions and the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretations).
189. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
190. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d at 445, 465 (N.J. 1993).
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employer is liable depends on the level of the employer's
involvement in the harassment. 9 ' The Lehman court held that an
employer is directly liable when the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment.' 92 The court reasoned that when the
employer fails to take effective measures to stop the harassment,
the employer has in effect given the harassed employee the message
that the supervisor's conduct is acceptable. '93 "'Effective' remedial
measures," the court continued, "are those reasonably calculated to
end the harassment. The 'reasonableness of an employer's remedy





After Lehman, the presence of an anti-harassment policy may
or may not protect the employer from liability for compensatory
damages.'9  For example, one court has held that when an
employee proves that the employer is vicariously liable for
supervisory harassment based on the "aided in the agency relation"
theory (section 219(2)(d)), the employer is vicariously liable
"irrespective of its anti-harassment policies."'" The problem with
this rationale is that the supervisor is almost always "aided by the
191. See id. (concluding that a variable three-part standard for equitable relief,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages should be employed).
192. Id. at 464 (using the vicarious liability standards set forth in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) as a basis for its holding, but also noting that the
employer's liability can also be understood as direct liability); see also supra note 7
(quoting the text of section 219).
193. Lehman, 626 A.2d at 464.
194. Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)).
195. See id. Under Lehman, the effectiveness of an employer's anti-harassment
policies is analyzed when considering whether the employer was negligent and thus
liable for compensatory damages. Id. at 626. The Lehman court also focused on
other degrees of employer culpability. For example, since employer liability for
equitable relief is strict, see id. at 460, anti-harassment procedures or an employer's
response to a victim's complaint are of no significance to an employer's defense.
Employers are liable for punitive damages "in the event of actual participation by
upper management or willful indifference" on the part of the employer. Id. at 464.
Since this standard requires some type of employer participation in the
harassment, even if by knowing about it and ignoring it, an employer could not
satisfy the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense. In practice, a court would
likely conclude that no reasonable finder of fact could find that the employer used
all reasonable means to address the problem when it actively participated in or was
willfully indifferent to the harassment. Thus, the mere presence of an anti-
harassment policy would likely be irrelevant to the employer's defense against
liability for equitable relief and punitive damages.
196. Newsome v. Administrative Office of the Cts. of N.J., 103 F. Supp. 2d 807,
822 (D.N.J. 2000) (denying the employer's summary judgment motion on the
plaintiff's LAD claims, but granting the employer's summary judgment motion on
the plaintiff's Title VII claims because the employer satisfied the affirmative
defense).
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agency relation." '97  Consequently, if the employer's anti-
harassment policies are irrelevant under the aided in the agency
relation theory, employers will not have an incentive to vigorously
enforce those policies because they will almost always be liable
under this theory. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes
the "aided by the agency relation" theory, yet allows the affirmative
defense for Title VII claims under that theory when there has not
been a tangible employment action.'98 Thus, the affirmative defense
should apply under both a negligence theory and the "aided by the
agency relation" theory.
The Lehman court provided some guidance to employers to
help them understand what preventative actions they must take to
provide evidence of due care.1" Addressing the role of an
employer's anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures, the
Lehman court stated:
[A] plaintiff may show that an employer was negligent by its
failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-
harassment policies, effective formal and informal complaint
structures, training and/or monitoring mechanisms. We do not
hold that the absence of such mechanisms automatically
constitutes negligence, nor that the presence of such
mechanisms demonstrates the absence of negligence. However,
the existence of effective preventative mechanisms 20rovides
some evidence of due care on the part of the employer.
197. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
198. See id.
199. Lehman v Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993); see also Newsome,
103 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (citing Lehman, 626 A.2d at 463, and stating that there are
five elements to "effective preventative mechanisms," including (1) policies; (2)
formal and informal complaint structures; (3) mandatory training for supervisors
and managers, as well as training offered to all employees; (4) some effective
monitoring mechanisms to find out if the policies and complaint structures are
trusted; and (5) an unequivocal commitment from management that the policy is
backed up by consistent practice). The Lehman court took these five "elements"
from a statement by Dr. Freada Klein to Congress, but the court did not state that
employers who do not employ all five elements fail to provide due care. See
Lehman, 626 A.2d at 463 (quoting The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R.)
Before the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 168, 207-14
(1991) (statement of Dr. Freada Klein)). Employers who do meet all five
"elements" will go farther in showing due care than employers who do not, but the
finder-of-fact will ultimately determine whether employer has used due care. See
infra note 200 and accompanying text.
200. Lehman, 626 A.2d at 463. Though the court discussed employer liability
under a negligence theory (Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219(2)(b)) in
this section of its opinion, the reasoning could also be adopted to apply to section
219(2)(d). See generally supra note 7 (quoting the text of section 219) and the text
2001]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In Payton v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., the court again
emphasized the importance of effective remedial measures. 1 The
court remarked that "[w]hile the effectiveness of... remedial steps
relates to an employee's claim of liability, it is also relevant to an
employer's affirmative defense that its actions absolve it from all
liability.'2 °2  The court also recognized the importance of
encouraging harassed employees to utilize remedial processes by
emphasizing that prolonged processes that leave the employee
exposed to continued hostility are not "effective., 203 Thus, the court
concluded that the competence of an employer's remedial program
is "highly relevant to both the employee's claim against the
employer and the employer's defense. '2°
Though the Payton court's remarks showed the importance of
employers and employees working together to combat supervisory
harassment, finders of fact still have little guidance on the degree of
action that employers must take when preventing or responding to
harassment in the workplace. Neither Payton nor Lehman
provided clear guidance on when an employer's "effective remedial
programs" will suffice to protect it from liability for supervisory
accompanying notes 196-98 (discussing the "aided in the agency" relationship,
theory of liability). If the employer did have well communicated anti-harassment
policies and/or easily identifiable and accessible complaint structures, the
employer would in essence be communicating that it does not tolerate any type of
harassment by supervisors. See Lehman, 626 A.2d at 463-64 (discussing the
significance of "effective remedial measures" under section 219(2)(d)). Thus, the
employees know that the employer is open to hearing their complaints. But see
Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco, 675 A.2d 684, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(holding that the employer could be liable under section 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency because [a] person will almost always feel more
at liberty to abuse someone over whom they have power."). It seems that the
court in Woods-Pirozzi read Lehman's directions regarding section 219(2)(d), as
providing no limit on employer liability. This is an extreme view and others should
not follow it because the Lehman court did discuss some remedial measures that
an employer could take to limit its liability. See generally Lehman, 626 A.2d at
463-64. Further, the court's holding in Woods-Pirozzi runs contrary to the U.S.
Supreme Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher that there should be some limits
on employer vicarious liability.
201. Payton v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 327 (N.J. 1991)
(concluding that "effective remedial measures" include the process by which the
employer arrives at the sanctions it imposes on the alleged harasser, and thus
materials related to these measures are generally discoverable).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 328. The Payton court recognized that, like the U.S. Supreme Court
in Meritor, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lehman has allowed employers to
avoid liability "by implementing effective procedures to combat this evil internally,





sexual harassment. Thus, putting "effective" remedial policies in
place, may or may not provide employers with a defense to avoid
all liability. This ambiguity does not give New Jersey's employers
legitimate credit for employing aggressive anti-harassment
programs. Further, the specific role that employees must play in
reporting the harassment is not emphasized, hence placing the
entire onus of combating the problem of supervisory harassment on
employers.
IV. Conclusion
In light of the LAD's frequent use in New Jersey, the guidance
that courts give to employers and employees who deal with
supervisory sexual harassment is crucial. When determining
whether to allow New Jersey's employers to assert and prove the
affirmative defense available under Title VII, New Jersey's courts
should look mainly to one important issue-the spirit of the LAD.
The Lehman court stated that "we view the issue of the scope
of an employer's liability for compensatory and punitive damages
as a question of public policy .... We view the critical issue to be
which position provides the most effective intervention and
prevention of employment discrimination. '"2 5  The court also
emphasized that "'[flor the protection of women and the education
of those who victimize them, it is necessary to explore less coercive
means of normative change' [than litigation and judicial
decrees]."2" Finally, the court emphasized that:
The most important tool in the prevention of sexual harassment
is the education of both employees and employers. Consensus
among employees and employers should be the goal. We think
that providing employers with the incentive not only to provide
voluntary compliance programs but also to insist on the effective
enforcement of their programs will do much to ensure that
hostile work environment discrimination claims disappear from
207the workplace and the courts.
This policy statement makes clear that effective anti-
harassment policies and procedures are, in the Lehman court's
mind, the best way to combat the problem of workplace
discrimination. Thus, employers should receive some incentive,
such as the Title VII affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and
205. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 465 (N.J. 1993).
206. Id. (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Trans-




Faragher, for promulgating and aggressively enforcing effective
anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures.
The Title VII affirmative defense is one practical incentive to
employers. Moreover, the affirmative defense calls on harassed
employees to come forward and report the harassment when it
begins. By providing an affirmative defense that places
responsibility for combating harassment on both employers and
employees, the U.S. Supreme Court has gone far to ensure that no
one in the workplace will tolerate harassing conduct. The
affirmative defense will also help to reduce litigation and the need
for judicial decrees because employers will know that they need to
aggressively enforce their policies, and employees will know that
they need to do their part by using the complaint procedures to
report harassment. Finally, judicial efficiency will prevail once the
LAD and Title VII have uniform rules for the burdens of
employers and employees when fighting sexual harassment in the
workplace. Thus, the efforts of both employers and employees will
hopefully stop harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive.
The New Jersey courts have, in the past, looked to Title VII as
a guide when interpreting the LAD. Following Ellerth and
Faragher, the New Jersey courts should again look to Title VII
jurisprudence to effectuate their goal of eradicating hostile work
environment harassment.
Benjamin C. Abrams
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